On December 20th, a man drove into a crowd at the Magdeburg Christmas Market. One person was killed, and up to 300 were injured. What were the reactions to the incident, and what is needed to prevent such occurrences in the future?
The Perpetrator: Visibly Invisible
The perpetrator, a political refugee from Saudi Arabia who had lived in Germany since 2006 and worked as a doctor for psychotherapy, was considered aggressive and isolated. On social media, he presented himself as an outspoken critic of Islam. He accused German authorities of not doing enough to combat Islamism.
In a video, he described himself as „left-wing“ but showed a clear affinity for far-right narratives and actors, referred to as „salad-bar extremism“. This term refers to the blending of contradictory ideologies into a personalised belief system. His account included critiques of the alleged „Islamisation“ of Europe, alongside open threats and far-right connections. Despite explicit calls for violence, his account garnered tens of thousands of followers. Despite being in contact with several journalists, despite being known to the police, despite numerous reports and warnings, his account was not suspended. And yet, there were no qualified measures for early detection and threat management.
Echo Chambers of Manipulation and Disinformation
Even before the attack, it was evident how dangerous social media can be in promoting polarisation and radicalisation. Platforms like X increasingly serve as echo chambers for far-right influencers, troll armies, and bot networks, facilitating the spread of radical ideologies and misinformation, amplified by algorithms that thrive on polarisation. Calls from platform owners to distrust traditional media exacerbate this dynamic.
Shortly after the attack, far-right groups exploited the incident to influence public opinion. Initially, an Islamist motive was circulated, but the rhetoric shifted as details about the perpetrator emerged. Targeted propaganda campaigns were launched. In Austria, the Identitarian Movement projected slogans like “Magdeburg. Remigration!” onto buildings. False information spread rapidly. Videos claiming the perpetrator shouted „Allahu Akbar“ achieved wide reach, despite clear evidence to the contrary. Once the Islamist motive was debunked, the discussion shifted to general criticism of immigration policy. The result: in the days following the attack, reports of verbal and physical assaults on people with migrant backgrounds increased. The shift in far-right narratives – from an Islamist motive to general criticism of migration – legitimised attacks on migrants.
Online Is Offline
For the future of prevention efforts, the lesson is clear: online is offline. Activities in the digital world have tangible consequences in the real world, and vice versa. Social media plays a significant role in shaping opinions and is a key element in the radicalisation process. Without regulation to curb disinformation and extremist content, these platforms will continue to deepen divisions and enable violence. Recent moves toward deregulation, however, risk further undermining democratic processes and trust in institutions.
In addition to improving the security infrastructure early threat detection is needed. Security authorities should identify and monitor potential threats. This includes analysing online activities and collaborating with social networks to detect suspicious behaviours.
This requires the promotion of societal resilience: Society should be made aware of the signs of radicalisation to take them seriously and respond at an early stage.
For practitioners in the field of prevention, the time has come to confront the challenges posed by online propaganda, disinformation, and radicalisation, and to consider how to effectively integrate technological tools into their work.
Solutions already exist, such as the Redirect Method by Moonshot, which employs targeted interventions – redirecting users searching for extremist content to supportive resources – while ensuring transparency and data privacy compliance.
We just need to start using them.
Washington Institute on the Redirect Method
Fabian Wichmann, co-leader of the Ideology and Conspiracy Narratives panel of the EUKH