This month our newsletter theme is „Extremism, Elections and the Battle for Narratives“.
In this first issue, we share an exclusive interview with Fabian Wichmann. We asked him 8 questions on the Magdeburg and the New Orleans attacks.
Both the Magdeburg and New Orleans attackers displayed patterns of online radicalisation and engagement with extremist narratives in digital spaces. This is nothing new for experts in the field. However, did the attacks show new trends in online radicalisation?
Fabian:
There are some similarities between the two cases, but also significant differences. On the one hand, they share certain characteristics, yet on the other, they are fundamentally distinct.
Starting with the Magdeburg attacker, he had lived in Germany as an asylum seeker since 2006. Between 2016 and 2024, he worked as a psychiatrist, fully integrated into society, and was also active on social media. He was well-known for engaging in public discussions, frequently posting on X (formerly Twitter), and was connected to journalists. He positioned himself as someone advocating for women facing difficulties, particularly regarding government policies and political Islam. His online presence made him a visible figure.
A key debate emerged regarding whether this was a terrorist attack or an amoklauf [a spree killing with no ideological motive]. Authorities have leaned towards the latter, citing the absence of key elements typically associated with terrorism: a consistent ideology, a clear goal, and a manifesto outlining political motives. In the case of the Magdeburg attacker, none of these were present.
In contrast, the New Orleans attacker was also well-integrated into society—he had a family, children, and a stable career history, including military service. However, he had financial difficulties and legal disputes with his ex-wife. Despite some criminal records, there was no prior indication of violent extremism.
Unlike the Magdeburg case, there was a clear ideological motivation: he had converted to Islam before the attack and sought to convey a specific message. His actions were driven by a political objective, making his case distinct from that of the Magdeburg attacker.
One common factor in both cases is the role of the online sphere. As mentioned, the Magdeburg attacker was highly active on X, which functioned as an echo chamber for him. While his posts did not receive much engagement, he was immersed in an algorithmic bubble that constantly fed him a distorted and threatening view of the world. He perceived the German government as failing to combat extremism and Islamism, leading him to believe that he alone needed to take action. His radicalisation process was deeply tied to this online environment.
The broader discussion on online versus offline radicalisation remains relevant, though not new. We have already seen in cases like the New Zealand and Oslo attacks how individuals used digital platforms to spread their ideology—through live-streaming attacks or publishing manifestos online.
These radical online spaces do not necessarily push individuals towards violence in a direct, personal manner. Instead, they create an environment that reinforces the perception that the world is deteriorating and that action is necessary.
The Magdeburg attacker, for example, may not have been explicitly encouraged by others, but the collective discourse in his online bubble likely reinforced his belief that he had to act.
This is the major challenge for X and other social networks: to critically assess their responsibility and consider what actions they can take. For most people, the divide between offline and online is increasingly blurred—it is all part of the same reality. Just as we are having this conversation online, digital platforms serve as a primary medium for communication and information. The question remains: how should they navigate this responsibility?